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Pleasure, Utility, and Choice
Abstract
When making most choices, people imagine how they will feel about the consequences. This chapter provides
an account of the anticipation process and uses it to predict choice. Decisions from several experiments are
consistent with a theory in which people are assumed to evaluate alternatives by making trade-offs between
predicted pleasure and pain. Then they choose the alternative with greater expected pleasure. The field of
decision making has long benefited from the interdisciplinary contributions of philosophers, economists, and
statisticians, among others. These interdisciplinary contibutions can be categorized into two camps. One
camp specifies how people should make choices if they wish to obey fundamental rules of logic and
probability. The other camp focuses on what people actually do when making choices. While rational theories
rely on beliefs and utilities, descriptive theories look to psychological processes including cognitive
limitations, social norms, and cultural constraints to explain actual choices and the reasons behind alleged
deviations from rationality. Both camps are well aware that emotions influence choice. Rational theorists have
addressed the question of whether emotions should influence choice, and descriptive theorists have explored
how emotions influence choice. This chapter presents a descriptive account of decision making that focuses
on anticipated pleasure. We propose that, when making a choice, people imagine how they will feel about
future consequences. Comparisons of qualitatively different feelings are made in terms of pleasure and pain.
That is, people evaluate each alternative by balancing imagined pleasure against imagined pain and select the
alternative with greater average pleasure.
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abstract
When making most choices, people imagine how they will feel about the conse-
quences. This chapter provides an account of the anticipation process and uses it to
predict choice. Decisions from several experiments are consistent with a theory in
which people are assumed to evaluate alternatives by making trade-offs between
predicted pleasure and pain. Then they choose the alternative with greater expected
pleasure.
The field of decision making has long benefited from the interdisciplinary
contributions of philosophers, economists, and statisticians, among others.
These interdisciplinary contibutions can be categorized into two camps.
One camp specifies how people should make choices if they wish to obey
fundamental rules of logic and probability. The other camp focuses on what
people actually do when making choices. While rational theories rely on
beliefs and utilities, descriptive theories look to psychological processes
including cognitive limitations, social norms, and cultural constraints to
explain actual choices and the reasons behind alleged deviations from
rationality.
Both camps are well aware that emotions influence choice. Rational the-
orists have addressed the question of whether emotions should influence
choice, and descriptive theorists have explored how emotions influence
choice. This chapter presents a descriptive account of decision making that
focuses on anticipated pleasure. We propose that, when making a choice,
people imagine how they will feel about future consequences. Compar-
isons of qualitatively different feelings are made in terms of pleasure and
pain. That is, people evaluate each alternative by balancing imagined plea-
sure against imagined pain and select the alternative with greater average
pleasure.
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background and foreground emotions
Emotions have direct and indirect effects on choice. Indirect emotions, such
as moods, temperaments, and dispositions, occur regardless of whether or
not people make a decision. These emotions shape choices in a variety
of ways. Happiness produces faster and more efficient decisions (Isen &
Means, 1983), more creative problem solving (Isen, 1987), greater asso-
ciations among ideas, and greater enjoyment in pleasurable tasks (Isen,
1993). Sadness leads to longer response times, greater discrimination be-
tween strong and weak arguments, and greater analytical thinking. Anger
produces faster responses and less discriminate use of information, and
fear leads to greater pessimism and risk aversion (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz,
& Strack, 1990; Fiedler, 1988; Forgas, 1992; Luce, 1998; Luce, Bettman, &
Payne, 1997; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).
Direct emotions occur when people make decisions. These emotions
can take two forms: process emotions and anticipated emotions. Process
emotions reflect feelings about the act of deciding. People might feel an-
noyed when they have no good options or conflicted when they have too
many good options (Dhar, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). People might feel
anxious when the stakes are high, the time is short, or the information is
ambiguous (Janis & Mann, 1977).
Anticipated emotions are imagined feelings about future outcomes of
a choice. These emotions may involve fear, guilt, anger, sadness, or joy. In
some cases, these emotions might be qualitatively different and hard to
compare. In these cases, pleasure and pain provide the common currency
for comparison.
We have studied the process by which people anticipate the pleasure
and pain of outcomes and have tried to relate those emotions to choice. We
now summarize some of our results.
investigating pleasure
Several of our studies use what decision theorists call “the gambling
paradigm.” Participants are asked to make choices between gambles with
monetary outcomes of wins or losses. Such choices have clear-cut prob-
abilities and outcomes and, most important, they are easy to manipulate
(Mellers et al., 1997, 1999). On any given trial, respondents are presented
with two gambles shown as pie charts on a computer screen. Different re-
gions of the pie charts represent wins or losses. In many studies, amounts
range from +US$32 to −US$32 and are large enough to produce strong
emotional reactions. Participants select the gamble they prefer to play. The
gamble is resolved, and the outcome is displayed. Finally, participants rate
their emotional reaction to the outcome.
In some tasks, gambles are only “partially” resolved. A spinner appears
in the center of the chosen gamble, while the unchosen gamble vanishes.
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The spinner begins to rotate, eventually stops, and participants learn the
outcome. This situation matches many real-world choices. People do not
know what would have happened if they had made the other choice.
In other tasks, gambles are “completely” resolved. Spinners appear in
the center of both gambles and rotate independently. When the spinners
stop, participants learn the outcomes of chosen and unchosen gambles.
This information – either expected or imagined – can have powerful ef-
fects on choice (Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1990;
Simonson, 1992).
We have investigated the pleasure of monetary wins and losses. To ex-
amine anticipated pleasure, we ask participants to make a choice between
gambles with hypothetical outcomes. When the gamble is resolved, peo-
ple imagine how they would feel. To investigate actual pleasure, we ask
participants to make choices between gambles with real outcomes. When
gambles are resolved, they rate their feelings about what actually hap-
pened to them. Anticipated pleasure and actual pleasure are expressed on
a category rating scale from 50 (very happy) to −50 (very unhappy).
Emotions are inherently relative, and anticipated pleasure is no excep-
tion. Anticipated pleasure depends on changes, not final states. In the gam-
bling paradigm, at least three reference points are salient. The status quo
is by far the most important. People are well aware of the difference be-
tween adding $5 to their pocketbooks and taking $5 out. A second ref-
erence point is the other outcome of the “chosen” gamble. When people
imagine an outcome, they are sensitive to whether it is better or worse than
the gamble’s other outcome. Such comparisons across states of the world
(or places the spinner could stop) are called “elation” and “disappoint-
ment,” respectively (Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1986). A third reference
point is the outcome of the “unchosen” gamble. Decision makers are also
sensitive to whether their outcome is better or worse than the outcome
of the gamble they did not choose. Such comparisons across choices are
called “rejoicing” and “regret,” respectively (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden,
1982).
Figure 17.1 shows the effects of disappointment and regret in our gam-
bling studies. Emotional reactions to $8 wins and $8 losses are presented
on the on the left and right, respectively. Slopes of the lines represent dis-
appointment effects; both gains and losses of $8 are more pleasurable
when the reference point (i.e., the other outcome of the chosen gamble)
is worse (−$32) than when the reference point is better ($32). Spaces be-
tween the lines represent regret effects. Again, outcomes are more pleasur-
able when the reference point is worse than when the reference point is
better.
Reference points have enormous effects on the pleasure of gains and
losses. Feelings about an $8 win range from “very pleasurable” when both
reference points are $32 losses to “just above neutral” when both reference
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figure 17.1. Disappointment and regret effects for wins and losses of $8, respec-
tively. Each point is the average of three means that differ in the probability of the
obtained outcome (.5 or .8), and all else is held constant.
points are $32 wins. Feelings about an $8 loss range from “very painful”
when both reference points are $32 wins to “slightly pleasurable” when
both reference points are $32 losses. In fact, disappointment and regret ef-
fects can make losses more pleasurable than gains. Feelings about losing $8
when both reference points are −$32 are more positive than feelings about
winning $8 when both reference points are +$32 (10 vs. 3, respectively).
Comparisons of disappointment and regret effects have revealed that
regret is often greater in magnitude than disappointment. Regret, unlike
disappointment, involves the element of control. Accountability and/or
responsibility often go with regret, but not with disappointment, and these
feelings may influence the weight of the comparisons (Kahneman & Miller,
1986; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Zeelenberg, van
Dijk, van der Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998).
the asymmetry of comparisons
In their classic theory of risky choice, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) proposed that people evaluate outcomes
relative to the status quo, and that value is asymmetric around the zero
point. The pain of a loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of
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figure 17.2. The asymmetry of comparisons. Slopes are steeper below the ref-
erence point than above the reference point. Panels show imagined weight loss
relative to the weekly goal, imagined grades relative to the expected grade, and
imagined feelings of Olympic athletes with their performance relative to their ex-
pected performance.
an equivalent gain. This asymmetry holds around personal comparisons,
social comparisons, and even counterfactual comparisons. Negative con-
trasts have greater impact than positive contrasts. As seen in Figure 17.1,
even a gain can feel like a loss when compared to an even larger gain.
Figure 17.2 shows the asymmetry in nongambling contexts when the
reference point depends on personal expectations and desires (Mellers
& McGraw, 2001). Panel A shows results from a dieting study. Clients
in a commercial weight-loss program were asked to predict their weekly
weight loss and anticipate how they would feel about various outcomes.
The next week when clients returned, they learned their actual weight
and reported their feelings about the outcome. Clients felt slightly pleased
about exceeding their weekly goal by one pound, but quite unhappy about
falling short of their goal by the same amount.
Panel B of Figure 17.2 shows results from a grading study. At the be-
ginning of the quarter, undergraduates who had decided to take a course
in introductory psychology were asked to predict their course grade and
anticipate their feelings about all possible grades. The following quarter,
the same undergraduates told us their actual grades and their emotional
reactions. Getting one grade higher than expected felt mildly good, but
getting one grade lower than expected was quite a blow.
Panel C presents findings from a study in which students were asked
to imagine the feelings of Olympic athletes who were given information
about the medal received and the medal expected. The students reported
that Olympic athletes who exceeded their expectations by one place would
be slightly happier, but those who fell short of their expectations by the
same amount would be much more disappointed.
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figure 17.3. Surprise effects in tasks of chance and skill. Anticipated pleasure
is plotted against surprisingness. Unlikely outcomes are emotionally amplified
relative to likely outcomes.
the weight of comparisons
Not all reference points are equally important. Those which are more be-
lievable, more salient, more controllable, and more mutable have greater
psychological impact. We have found that comparisons between an out-
come and a reference point are weighted by the surprisingness of the out-
come. Surprise is based on luck or skill, but it can also depend on other
factors, such as the vividness of that outcome, the availability of the out-
come, and the ease with which it comes to mind. Unexpected or surpris-
ing outcomes – either good or bad – have greater emotional impact than
expected outcomes (Shepperd & McNulty, 2002). We call this result the
surprise effect.
Figure 17.3 presents three examples of surprise effects. Panel A shows
results from a task of physical skill. In this case, surprise depends on one’s
assessment of one’s own ability. Recreational basketball players took shots
from predesignated locations on the court. Before each shot, they judged
their confidence in success. After each shot, they judged their emotional
reaction. With tasks of skill, surprise is inferred from confidence. When a
player misses a shot, we assume that surprise is directly related to confi-
dence. When a player makes a shot, we assume that surprise is inversely
related to confidence. Surprise is either confidence (with a failure) or con-
fidence subtracted from 100 percent (with a success). Panel A shows that
more surprising successes are more pleasurable, and more surprising fail-
ures are more painful.
Panel B shows surprise effects from a task of mental skill. In this study,
undergraduates participated in a spelling bee. They heard a word, tried to
spell it, and judged their confidence that they were correct. Students were
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then shown the spelling of the word and rated their feelings about their
performance. Pleasure is plotted against surprisingness, as derived from
judged confidence. Once again, unexpected successes are more pleasur-
able, and unexpected failures are more painful.
Panel C shows surprise effects from a gambling study. With tasks of
chance, surprise depends on objective probabilities. The anticipated plea-
sure of an $8 win is greater when the chances are smaller (20%) than when
they are larger (80%). Similar effects occur with losses. In sum, surprising
wins are more pleasurable than expected wins, and surprising losses are
more painful than expected losses for tasks of both skill and chance.
describing anticipated pleasure
The effects of comparisons and beliefs shown in Figures 17.1 through
17.3 can be explained by an account we call decision affect theory (Mellers
et al., 1997, 1999). Imagine a decision maker faced with a choice between
Gambles 1 and 2. Gamble 1 has two outcomes, A and B. When the de-
cision maker anticipates the pleasure of outcome A, the process can be
represented as:
RA = J [uA + d(uA − uB)∗(1 − sA)], (1)
where RA is the anticipated pleasure of A, J is a linear function that converts
an imagined feeling to a numerical response, uA and uB are the utilities of
outcomes A and B relative to the status quo, and d(uA – uB) is a disappoint-
ment function that represents the pleasure of A relative to B, the other
outcome of the gamble. Finally, sA is the belief that outcome A will occur,
and 1 – sA is the surprisingness of A (i.e., the belief that A will not oc-
cur). The disappointment function is weighted by the surprisingness of A
relative to B.
Now consider the anticipated pleasure of outcome A when the decision
maker imagines that outcome, C will occur if Gamble 2 is chosen. The
anticipated pleasure of outcome A in the context of outcome C is:
RA(C) = J [uA + d(uA − uB)∗(1 − sA) + r (uA − uC)∗(1 − sAsC)] (2)
where the first two terms on the right-hand side of the equation are identical
to those in Equation 1, and the third term, r(uA – uC), is the comparison of
A with C. This function is the regret function and is weighted by (1 – sAsC),
the surprisingness of the joint event of A and C.
Decision affect theory predicts that anticipated pleasure reflects
weighted changes relative to salient reference points. The utility of A, uA,
is the pleasure of A relative to the status quo. The disappointment func-
tion, d(uA – uB), is the pleasure of A relative to B, and the regret function,
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r(uA – uC), is the pleasure of A relative to the C. The impact of the disap-
pointment and regret functions varies with the surprisingness of the imag-
ined outcome. This theory has done an excellent job describing judged plea-
sure of outcomes in both experimental and observational studies (Mellers,
2000; Mellers et al., 1997, 1999).
relating anticipated pleasure to choice
Recent interest in the relationship between emotions and choice has led to
numerous theoretical developments that differ in their assumptions about
which reference points are important and the functional form of the com-
parisons (Bell, 1982, 1985; Gul, 1991; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Loomes
& Sugden, 1982, 1986; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt,
2001). All of the theories assert that people anticipate their feelings rela-
tive to anchors, sum those feelings over outcomes, and select the option
with greater anticipated pleasure. Our theory, called subjective expected
pleasure theory, falls into this general framework (Mellers et al., 1999).
We further propose that the anticipated pleasure of outcomes can be de-
scribed by decision affect theory. Then we assume that, when evaluating
an option such as a gamble, people weigh their anticipated feeling about
each outcome by the likelihood that they will experience that emotion and
aggregate over anticipated emotions. Finally, they select the gamble with
greater average pleasure.1
Let us return to the decision maker facing the choice between Gambles 1
and 2. When that decision maker anticipates the pleasure of outcomes
independent of outcomes of other gambles, subjective expected pleasure
theory predicts that the average pleasure of Gamble 1 will be:
sARA + sBRB (3)
where sA and sB are the beliefs that outcomes A and B will occur, and
RA is the prediction of anticipated pleasure from decision affect theory
(Equation 1). The expected pleasure of Gamble 2, with outcomes C and
D is:
sCRC + sDRD, (4)
and our decision maker selects the gamble with greater average pleasure.
Now consider a more complex case in which the anticipated pleasure
of an outcome depends on imagined outcomes of the other gamble. The
1 Pleasure does not necessarily imply hedonism. It comes from many sources, including acts
of virtue or relief from pain. Likewise, pain arises from an aggressive impulse, a sense of
injustice, or frustration from falling short of a goal.
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average pleasure of Gamble 1 depends on the anticipated pleasure of A in
the context of C and D and B in the context of C and D, as follows:
sA[sCRA(C) + sDRA(D)] + sB[sCRB(C) + sDRB(D)]. (5)
where RA(C) is the anticipated pleasure of outcome A in the context of
outcome C from decision affect theory (Equation 2). The expected pleasure
of Gamble 2 follows a similar pattern:
sC[sARC(A) + sBRC(B)] + sD[sARD(A) + sBRD(B)], (6)
and the gamble with greater average pleasure is selected.
Subjective expected pleasure theory is similar to the leading rational ac-
count of choice known as subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954).
In subjective expected utility theory, choices are based on a comparison
of the average utilities of options. The choice between Gambles 1 and 2
would be a comparison of the expected utility of Gamble 1:
sAuA + sBuB, (7)
where sA and sB are the beliefs that A and B will occur and uA and uB are
the utilities of the outcomes with the expected utility of Gamble 2:
sCuC + sDuD. (8)
Decision makers select the gamble with greater expected utility.
The key difference between our descriptive theory and the rational one
is the distinction between anticipated pleasure and utility. Pleasure often
differs from utility. The utility of a smaller win can never be greater than
the utility of a larger win. But the pleasure of a smaller, surprising win can
exceed the pleasure of a larger, expected win. Furthermore, the utility of a
loss can never be greater than the utility of a win. But the pain of a loss that
could have been a much larger can be less than the pain of a win that could
have been a much larger. These differences between utilities and emotions
are easily predicted by decision affect theory.
subjective expected pleasure theory
We have examined the extent to which subjective expected pleasure theory
predicts choice proportions in five gambling studies. Predictions for the
theory were obtained for group data in the following way. First, decision
affect theory was fit to mean judgments of anticipated pleasure separately
in each condition (as in Equations 1 or 2). Second, estimated parameters
of the theory were used to compute the average anticipated pleasure of
each gamble (as in Equations 3 and 4). Third, predicted choices were based
on the assumption that people preferred the gamble with greater average
pleasure.
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The correlation between aggregated choice proportions and binary pre-
dictions of subjective expected pleasure theory ranged from 0.66 to 0.86
across the five studies, with an average correlation of 0.74. These correla-
tions may seem low, but it is important to keep in mind that predictions for
choice were obtained from fit of another theory (decision affect theory) to
another set of data (anticipated pleasure). Decision affect theory provides
a theoretical framework for both pleasure and choice.
How well does the theory predict individual choices? To answer this
question, we examined the correlation between individual choices and
predictions using data from Mellers et al. (1999).2 First, we fit each indi-
vidual’s judgments of anticipated pleasure to decision affect theory. Using
parameters from decision affect theory, we calculated the average plea-
sure of each gamble. Then, to compute predicted choices, we assumed that
individuals would select the gamble with greater average pleasure. The
median correlation between predicted and actual choices was 0.34 and
0.38 in conditions with partial and complete feedback, respectively. These
correlations, though much lower than those based on group data, differed
significantly from zero for virtually all of the seventy-four subjects.
Tests of subjective expected pleasure theory with observational stud-
ies are more difficult for two reasons. First, we used participants who had
already made a choice, so we did not know the other options under consid-
eration. Second, all participants in each study made the same choice (taking
a course, having a pregnancy test, or joining a weight-loss program). De-
spite these difficulties, there is a weak, though testable, implication of the
theory. For each individual, we can ask whether the expected pleasure of
the chosen option was greater than zero. That is, does the average pleasure
of the chosen option exceed that of the status quo?
Figure 17.4 shows the average anticipated pleasure of the chosen option
for individuals in three observational studies. Panel A presents data from a
pregnancy study. Women who were waiting for a pregnancy test at Planned
Parenthood imagined how they would feel about negative or positive test
results. They also told us the probabilities that each result would occur.
A small percentage of women felt very unhappy, but for the majority, the
expected pleasure of the chosen option of unprotected sex was positive.
Similar patterns appeared with the grading and dieting experiments in
Panels B and C. On average, most of the students expected to feel good
about their performance in the course. Similarly, clients at the weight-loss
program expected to be pleased, on average, with their dieting attempts.
Thus, the majority of participants in the three studies chose options that
2 When we fit decision affect theory to individual judgments of anticipated pleasure, we
assumed that subjective beliefs were equivalent to objective beliefs and utilities were power
functions with exponents that could differ for gains and losses.
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figure 17.4. Tests of subjective expected pleasure theory in three observational
studies. The theory predicts that the average pleasure of the selected option will be
greater than zero. For most subjects the prediction holds.
were associated with positive expected feelings, as predicted by subjective
expected pleasure theory.
how accurately do people anticipate pleasure?
If decision makers compare options by attending to expected pleasure, the
accuracy of their affective forecasts becomes essential. Inaccurate predic-
tions could easily lead to suboptimal choice (Kahneman, 1994). Several
experiments have identified errors in affective forecasting (Loewenstein &
Schkade, 1999). Some of these errors are different forms of myopia. One
such error arises when we allow our immediate feelings to have undue
influence on our predictions of future feelings. When feeling happy, peo-
ple overestimate the probability of a favorable outcome, underestimate the
chances of an unfavorable outcome, and retrieve more happy memories
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Nygren, Isen, Taylor, & Dulin, 1996; Wright &
Bower, 1990).
Another error occurs when people focus on the immediate but irrele-
vant features of future outcomes. Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, and
Wheatley (1998) asked assistant professors to predict their feelings about
getting and not getting tenure. Not surprisingly, the same professors ex-
pected to be happy if they received tenure, and extremely unhappy other-
wise. Some time later, Gilbert et al. interviewed the same professors, found
out what had happened, and asked them how they actually felt. Those
who had been denied tenure were much happier than they had expected
to be.
Schkade and Kahneman (1998) also demonstrated that, when predicting
affect, people tend to focus on features of an outcome that are salient at
the moment. They asked students in the Midwest and California to judge
how happy they were and how happy they thought other students like
them living in the other region were. Schkade and Kahneman’s survey was
designed to highlight the advantages of California – better climate, more
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figure 17.5. Accuracy tests of anticipated pleasure. Anticipated and actual plea-
sure, shown as dashed and solid lines, respectively, from the gambling, grading,
pregnancy, and dieting studies. For the most part, average forecasts are accurate, al-
though dieters tend to expect to feel worse about gaining weight than they actually
feel.
cultural opportunities, and greater natural beauty over the Midwest. Both
Californians and Midwesterners thought students in California would be
happier, but in fact, the groups were equally happy on average.
Some of our experiments allow us to check the accuracy of affective
forecasts. Figure 17.5 shows average anticipated pleasure (dashed lines)
and average actual pleasure (solid lines) as a function of outcomes in the
gambling, grading, pregnancy, and dieting experiments. Participants were
reasonably good, on average, at forecasting their feelings. In the gambling
study, the dashed and solid lines were quite close. Even at the level of the
individual decision maker, average errors between anticipated and actual
feelings about monetary outcomes rarely deviated significantly from zero.
Students in the grading study were also reasonably accurate at forecasting
their feelings about course grades. Moreover, women at Planned Parent-
hood could also predict their feelings about test results.
The only experiment that showed systematic deviations between ac-
tual and anticipated feelings was the dieting study. Clients expected to
feel worse about gaining (or not losing) weight than they actually felt.
They overestimated the pain of an undesirable outcome. However, this
prediction error might have been strategic; clients may have tried to con-
vince themselves that they would feel worse about gaining weight in
an effort to control their behavior. We now turn to the topic of strategic
emotions.
strategic emotions
In a classic paper, Taylor and Brown (1988) argued that people are often
overly optimistic about themselves and their assessment of the future.
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Moreover, such inflated self-perceptions could be strategic if they led to
more creative and productive work (Taylor, 1989; Taylor and Brown, 1994).
Despite the potential virtues, excessive optimism can have the undesirable
effect of setting people up for disappointment.3 People appear to be aware
of this problem and often take actions to avoid disappointment by adjusting
their beliefs downward to more realistic or even pessimistic levels (Sanna,
1999; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998;
Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995; van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 2001). In
one example, Shepperd et al. (1996) asked college sophomores, juniors, and
seniors to estimate a starting salary for their first postgraduate job. Salaries
were predicted at the beginning and end of the spring term. Only seniors
looking for jobs immediately after graduation lowered their estimates at
the end of the term, right before they would face the world. People are
aware that bad news feels worse when unexpected, and they strategically
change their expectations to avoid disappointment.
Strategic shifts of emotions can also occur after a decision was resolved
if the outcome was bad. Tykocinski, Pick, and Kedmi (2001) identified a
process they call retroactive pessimism. In an attempt to regulate disap-
pointment, people change their beliefs about the likelihood of an unfavor-
able outcome and take the position that the event was inevitable. Decision
affect theory predicts that such shifts in belief, both before and after the
decision is resolved, can diminish the pain of unfavorable outcomes.
conclusion
Anticipated pleasure is inherently relative and governed by change with
respect to reference points. Kahneman and Tversky have suggested that
the pain of a loss has greater impact than the pleasure of comparable gain,
an effect they called loss aversion. Furthermore, they asserted that change
around the status quo has differential impact, with negative comparisons
having greater impact than positive comparisons. We have found similar
asymmetries around other reference points. Not only is the pain of a loss
greater than the pleasure of an equivalent gain, but the pain of a relative
loss is greater in magnitude than the pleasure of a comparable relative
gain.
Effects of reference points have been investigated with functional imag-
ing studies. Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, and Shizgal (2001) presented
participants with monetary gambles. A spinner appeared in the center
3 Harrison and March (1994) have also argued, albeit on entirely different grounds, that when
people make decisions, they often expect too much and set themselves up for disappoint-
ment.
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of each gamble, rotated, and eventually stopped. Breiter et al. examined
neurological responses to constant outcomes that were either the best or
the worst possible consequences of the gamble. Dopamine neurons in sev-
eral regions of the brain were sensitive to reference point effects. Holding
all else constant, greater activation of dopamine neurons occurred when
the same outcome was the best possible consequence of the gamble than
when it was the worst.
The anticipated pleasure of outcomes also varies with beliefs about what
will occur. Unexpected outcomes are more intense than expected ones; sur-
prising good outcomes are more pleasurable, and surprising bad outcomes
are more painful. Once again, there are parallels between judgments of an-
ticipated pleasure and electrophysiological studies of dopamine neurons
(Schultz et al., 1992, 1993, 1997). When monkeys expect a reward, dopamine
neurons start to fire. When monkeys receive that reward, neuronal firing
depends on prior expectations. Unexpected rewards lead to greater firing
than expected rewards.
We have summarized the effects of outcomes, comparisons, and surprise
in an account of anticipated pleasure called decision affect theory. The the-
ory predicts that anticipated pleasure is relative and governed by changes
and beliefs. This account of pleasure has also been applied to choice. We of-
fer a theory of choice called subjective expected pleasure theory in which
people anticipate the pleasure of outcomes, weigh their feelings by the
chances they will occur, sum over outcomes, and select options that, on
average, provide them with greater pleasure. Anticipated pleasure can be
described by decision affect theory.
Are people aware of the expected pleasure associated with risky
options? Schwartz (1997) investigated this question by asking people to
judge the average pleasure they imagined feeling each time they played
a gamble, if they could play it an infinite number of times. People were
quite good at judging their average feelings, and overall evaluations of
gambles were closely related to the subjective expected pleasure of the
gambles.
Another way to investigate the awareness of expected pleasure is to look
into whether participants are capable of using different hedonic choice
rules. In a two-part study, Schwartz, Mellers, and Metzger (1999) asked
people to make choices between gambles and judge the pleasure of mone-
tary outcomes. Later, they asked the same people to make choices between
the same gambles, but this time, they were instructed to either maximize
the pleasure of their experiences or minimize the displeasure of their ex-
periences. Predictions for these hedonic choice rules could be constructed
by examining the judged pleasure of outcomes from the first part of the
study and determining, for each individual, what choice would maximize
pleasure or minimize displeasure. Participants did not follow instructions
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perfectly, but they did adjust their choices in the right directions. The results
provide further evidence that people are, at least to some extent, aware of
the influence of emotions on choice and at least partially capable of con-
trolling their choices to achieve hedonic goals.
How Should Emotions Influence Choice?
Emotions have traditionally been regarded as impediments to rational
choice. They wreak havoc on orderly thought and interrupt logical rea-
soning. However, some theorists have recognized the beneficial effects of
emotions. Darwin (1872) noted that many emotional expressions are adap-
tive. Surprise often leads people to open their eyes as wide as possible and
obtain as much new information as they can. Anger often leads to aggres-
sive expressions. Chimpanzees who are threatened show their teeth and
in the process signal their ability, and perhaps intention, to attack. Such
expressions have evolved for long-term survival.
Scherer (1984) argues that emotions may have evolved to replace re-
flexes, instincts, and simple stimulus-response chains. The decoupling of a
single response from an eliciting stimulus allows opportunities for a wide
array of reactions. Fridja (1986) has noted that emotions help to mobilize
behavior by serving as relevance detectors. Others point out that emotions
provide useful information about our internal states (Clore & Parrott, 1991;
Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
Frank (1988) has stressed the advantages of emotions as solutions to
commitment problems. Some choices require difficult-to-reverse commit-
ments that may run counter to short-term interests. Couples considering
marriage and children may feel reluctant to enter into an agreement for fear
of the other leaving when a more attractive mate becomes available. The
bonds of romantic love can provide solutions that work far better than de-
tailed contracts. Emotions solve social problems as well by providing con-
straints for proper behavior. Most people can imagine feeling guilty about
lying or cheating, and those imagined feelings encourage socially accept-
able behavior. Positive feelings also provide constraints. Widely known
and shared positive feelings about fairness deter people from behaving
selfishly.
The topic of how people should use their emotions is controversial one.
Some argue that regret and disappointment are often momentary feelings
that distract us from long-range plans. On the other hand, the emotional
consequences of decisions may be just as important as the material con-
sequences. In this view, emotions are an essential part of what it means
to be rational (Damasio, 1994). These philosophical debates are not easily
resolved. However, it is abundantly clear that cognition and emotion are
closely intertwined, and connections between these processes are highly
relevant to decision making. We believe rationality and emotion-based
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decision making are not as far apart as was once thought. Our results sug-
gest that the rational theory may be a special case of certain emotion-based
choices.
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